Aspects have been successfully promoted as a means to improve the modularization of software in the presence of crosscutting concerns. The so-called aspect interference problem is considered to be one of the remaining challenges of aspect-oriented software development: aspects may interfere with the behavior of the base code or other aspects. Especially interference between aspects is difficult to prevent, as this may be caused solely by the composition of aspects that behave correctly in isolation. A typical situation where this may occur is when multiple advices are applied at the same, or shared, join point.
An example conflict: Security vs. Logging.
We first briefly present an example of a behavioral conflict. Assume that there is a base system which uses a Protocol to interact with other systems. Class Protocol has two methods: one for transmitting, sendData(String) and for receiving, receiveData(String). Now image that we would like to secure this protocol. To achieve this, we encrypt all outgoing messages and decrypt all incoming messages. We implement this as an encryption advice on the execution of method sendData. Likewise, we superimpose a decryption advice on method receiveData. Now imagine a second aspect which traces all the methods and possible arguments. The implementation of the tracing aspect uses a condition to dynamically determine if the current method should be traced, as tracing all the methods is not very efficient. The tracing aspect can, for instance, be used to create a stack trace of the execution within a certain package.
These two advices are superimposed on the same join point, in this case Protocol.sendData 1 . As the advices have to be sequentially executed, there are two possible execution orders here. Now assume that we want to ensure that no one accesses the data before it is encrypted. This constraint is violated, if the two advices are ordered in such a way that advice tracing is executed before advice encryption. We may end up with a log file which contains "sensitive" information. The resulting situation is what we call a behavioral conflict. We can make two observations, the first is that there is an ordering dependency between the aspects. If advice trace is executed before advice encryption, we might expose sensitive data. The second observation is that, although this order can be statically determined, we are unsure whether the conflicting situation will even occur at runtime, as advice trace is conditionally executed.
Approach.
An approach for detecting such behavioral conflicts at shared join points has been detailed in [1] . A shared join point has multiple advices superimposed on it. These are, in most AOP systems, executed sequentially. This implies an ordering between the advices, which can be (partially) specified by the aspect programmer. This ordering may or may not cause the behavioral conflict. The conflict in the example, is the case where the ordering causes the conflict. However there are conflicts, like synchronization and realtime behavior, which are independent of the chosen order.
One key observation we have made, is the fact that modelling the entire system, is not only extremely complex but it also does not model the conflict at the appropriate level of abstraction. With this we mean, that during the transformation, of behavior to read and write operations on a set of variables, we might loose important information. In our example we encrypt the arguments of a message to provide some level of security. Modelling this as a write on the arguments can work in some cases, however this makes expressing application specific conflict patterns hard. i.e. we do not want to consider all changes of all arguments of all messages conflicting. Also semantically, the encrypt operation does not change the value of the arguments, it only presents the data in a different form.
Our approach revolves around abstracting the behavior of an advice into a resource operation model. Here the resources present common or shared interactions (e.g. a semaphore). These resources are thus potential conflicting "areas". Advices interact with resources using operations. As the advices are sequentially composed at a shared join point, we can also sequentially compose the operations for each (shared) resource. After this composition, we verify whether a set of rules accepts the resulting sequence of operations for that specific resource. These rules can either be conflict rules, i.e. a pattern which is not allowed to occur, or an assertion rule, i.e. a pattern which must always occur. These rules can be expressed as a regular expression or a temporal logic formula.
In [1] , an instantiation of the presented model for the Composition Filters approach is shown. We adopted this approach, as the filter language is to a large extent declarative, and the compositional semantics are well-defined. This improves reasoning about the combination of multiple advice at the same join point. In addition, the filters provide encapsulation of the behavior through the use of filter types, which can be reused. However, there are elements which are filter instance specific and must be analyzed for each instance of a filter, such as the condition and matching parts of the filter. The conflict detection model can be enriched with domain or application specific information to capture more application or domain specific conflicts.
There are many steps involved in processing and analyzing a sequence of filters on a specific join point. One such step is to analyze the effects of each of the composed filters. A filter can either execute an accept action or a reject reject, given a set of conditions and a message. Next we have to determine which filter actions can be reached and whether, for example, the target has been read in the matching part. These actions perform the specific tasks of the filter type, e.g. the Encrypt action of filter type Encryption will encrypt the arguments. Likewise, the Trace action of the filter type ParameterTracing will trace the message. Most filter types execute the Continue action if the filter rejects. Imagine the following composed filter sequence on method Protocol.sendData in our example. The result is the following composed filter sequence: This filter sequence can be translated to the filter execution graph in figure 1 . The italic labels on the transitions are evalutions of the conditions (e.g. ShouldTrace), and the message matching, e.g. message.sel(ector) == sendData. The bold labels on the transitions show the filter actions. The underlined labels are resourceoperations tuples corresponding to the evaluation of the conditions, matching parts and the filter actions. From this graph we can see that in the left most path, the arguments are read before they are encrypted. This path thus violates the encryption requirement described in the example.
In Compose* we analyze the conflicts statically. However, it is not always possible to determine statically whether certain conflicts occur. There are three situations where dynamic verification is relevant:
1. If a program uses dynamic or conditional superimposition, and we detect a conflict in the program, we can only issue a warning at compile time. Only at runtime can we be sure that the conflict occurs. 2. Similarly, if the program uses conditional or dynamic advice execution. Here we also have to monitor the system at runtime to detect the conflict. 3. Concurrency can cause a wide variation of interleavings, including potentially conflicting sequences. This requires full monitoring of the advice at shared join points. For the dynamic and conditional superimposition or advice execution, we can only issue a warning at compile time but we have to monitor the execution to detect the conflict at runtime. However, we can use the analysis results from the compile time to determine which paths of the composed program at a shared join point may potentially lead to a conflict.
As illustrated in figure 1 , we have an internal representation of the sequence of filters at a shared join point. This representation is an execution graph, in which all the possible messages are simulated. Each end state of this graph corresponds to an unique path through the filter sequence. The graph branches if a condition is used within the filters. It also accounts for the various ways a message can flow through the filter sequence.
For each such path we know which conflict rule matches and which assertion rule rule does not match. We also know the transitions required to reach the erroneous end state. This information can be used to inject bookkeeping information at the transitions with are part of the path leading to the erroneous end state. This bookkeeping information performs the operations on the specific resources. If a, possible erroneous, final state is reached, we verify whether the conflict rules match or whether assertion rules do not match. If so, we can throw an exception, which can be handled by the user.
